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11 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
7cc50973f6 feat: custom brand name everywhere + a working client-facing site out of the box
User ask, paraphrased: install it, get help wiring up payments, and
immediately have a ready site under your own name — not "MBS Panel"
plastered everywhere and a bunch of manual follow-up.

Two things were actually broken/missing, found by tracing every surface
a real customer or the operator would see:

1. "MBS Panel" was hardcoded in ~20 places (bot messages, subscription
   page, admin panel splash/title/sidebar, legal pages, 2FA issuer,
   install.sh) with zero way to change it short of editing source.
   New BRAND_NAME config value (config.py default "MBS Panel", so this
   is 100% backward compatible for existing installs) wired through
   everywhere via the same live-settings pattern from the last commit
   (settings.get_brand_name(), no restart needed anywhere it's used).
   New Настройки → «Название» section in the admin panel to change it.

2. site/index.html and site/cabinet.html — a fully-built landing page +
   personal-cabinet template, already in the repo — were never actually
   served by anything. Not mounted by FastAPI, not deployed by
   install.sh, not linked from anywhere. Pure dead weight: a repo that
   looked like it shipped a client site but didn't. Now legal.py gets a
   render_site_page() (same {{TOKEN}} substitution + HTML-escaping as
   the existing offer/privacy renderer, new tokens: BRAND_NAME,
   SITE_DOMAIN, SUB_DOMAIN, BOT_USERNAME) and GET "/" serves the branded
   landing page on any host that isn't PANEL_DOMAIN (in practice:
   SUB_DOMAIN, which nginx already routes to this backend — zero
   install.sh/nginx/certbot changes needed, so this is live on every
   existing install without an upgrade step beyond `mbs update`).
   GET /cabinet.html serves the cabinet. Landing page's pricing section
   now fetches real, live prices from a new public GET /api/plans
   instead of showing static duration labels with no numbers.

Also fixed along the way, same staleness-bug class as the payments/HWID
fix last commit, found by grepping for every remaining frozen `from
config import ...` in api.py: BOT_TOKEN/BOT_USERNAME were still frozen
constants in api.py (mbs-api never restarts itself). Concretely this
meant: changing the bot via Настройки → Telegram-бот would leave
_tg_send_message (payment-received notifications) silently trying the
OLD token, admin_get_bot_settings showing the OLD username right after
a successful save, and gift-code links pointing at the OLD bot — all
until a manual mbs restart, same shape as the Platega-secret bug fixed
last commit. Added settings.bot_credentials(), wired it through every
call site (hoisted out of loops where relevant, same N+1 discipline as
always), removed the now-stale "выполни mbs restart" copy from the bot
settings hint.

legal.py's own BOT_USERNAME import was frozen too (used by the /offer
and /privacy {{BOT_USERNAME}} token) — switched to reading it live
in-module (no settings.py import from legal.py, would've been circular
since settings.py already imports legal.py for the env reader).

install.sh: new interactive prompt for the brand name (default "MBS
Panel", so hitting enter reproduces today's behavior exactly), written
to .env, echoed in the final summary along with the now-live site URL.

Verification: same story as always — api.py/bot.py still can't import
locally (no pydantic-core wheel for Python 3.14 on this machine).
py_compile + pyflakes clean across the whole repo. Real runtime test
against an isolated .env fixture: brand name and bot-credential live
reads (no reimport), render_site_page() token substitution correctness
on the actual site/index.html and site/cabinet.html files including an
XSS check (brand name containing <script> comes out HTML-escaped), and
a regression check that adding the BRAND_NAME token to the existing
legal.render() didn't break offer.html/privacy.html. Extracted
SUB_PAGE_TEMPLATE/SUB_PAGE_EXPIRED_TEMPLATE via ast from api.py (can't
import the module, but can pull the string constants) and ran the real
.format() calls against them to catch any brace-escaping mistake in the
new {brand_name} placeholder — CSS braces in those templates are
already double-escaped for .format(), easy to get wrong. Extracted and
node --check'd admin.html's whole inline script, div-tag-balance check
on the full file. install.sh's new prompt+heredoc snippet run standalone
with piped stdin (both a brand name with spaces and an empty/default
input), round-tripped the resulting .env back through the real
env-parsing logic. Extended the existing CI "app wiring" step (which
does import api/bot for real on Linux) with branding assertions calling
the actual route functions directly (api.root(), api.public_plans(),
api.public_branding()) — ran every part of that step's new logic that
doesn't need api.py locally first, to catch what's catchable before
trusting the rest to CI once the account's abuse-review lifts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 23:52:54 +05:00
7d140711fd feat: plan prices, payment toggles and HWID limit now editable live from the admin panel, no restart
Closes the last "still .env-only" gap from the backlog (tariffs/HWID) and
fixes a real bug found while building it: payment provider credentials and
enabled-flags were frozen in api.py's process at import time, so a Platega
secret rotation via the settings UI would leave api.py verifying inbound
webhooks against the OLD secret until a manual `mbs restart` — while
bot.py (which does get restarted on save) already had the new one. Same
class of staleness affected HWID_LIMIT_ENABLED/HWID_FALLBACK_LIMIT and
plan prices, neither of which had any settings UI at all before this.

New `settings.py` module: get_plans()/get_plans_by_code() (live prices,
falls back to config.py defaults), get_payment_settings(), get_hwid_settings(),
yookassa_credentials()/platega_credentials(), set_plan_prices() — all backed
by a new batched legal.read_env_vars() (one file read for N keys instead of
N reads) and legal.update_env_var() (moved out of api.py's private
_update_env_var, which is now a one-line delegate to avoid duplicating the
same env-file-rewrite logic in two places).

api.py and bot.py no longer import PLANS/PLANS_BY_CODE/PAYMENTS_ENABLED/
HWID_LIMIT_ENABLED/HWID_FALLBACK_LIMIT from config as frozen constants —
every read goes through settings.py instead. payments.py no longer imports
YOOKASSA_*/PLATEGA_* from config either; every provider call (create/check
payment, verify webhook signature) reads live credentials at call time.
Every call site inside a loop hoists the live lookup before the loop first
(same N+1 discipline as the rest of tonight), so this doesn't regress
get_subscription's hot path — one settings.get_hwid_settings() call per
request, same as before.

New routes: GET/POST /admin/api/payments/plan-settings (per-plan prices +
a payments_enabled master toggle — there was previously no way to turn
payment collection back off without deleting provider credentials),
GET/POST /admin/api/hwid-settings. Both validate input strictly (prices:
non-negative int; HWID limit: 1-1000) and reject the whole request instead
of partially applying on bad input.

admin.html: new "Тарифы" section in Платежи (price inputs rendered from
the live plan list + payments toggle) and "Лимит устройств (HWID)" in
Настройки, both using the existing .check checkbox / plain-input styling
(no native <select>, per the earlier white-popup complaint). Removed the
now-incorrect "выполни mbs restart" copy from the YooKassa/Platega settings
hints and save-result messages, and added a doc-block for HWID (never had
one) plus extended the Платежи doc-block to mention live-apply. Also
dropped a dead `import links` in bot.py caught by pyflakes while verifying
this.

Verification: api.py/bot.py still can't be imported on this Windows
machine (no prebuilt pydantic-core wheel for Python 3.14, confirmed again
by a fresh pip attempt — same wall as every prior session), so relied on
what's actually exercisable: py_compile + pyflakes (zero undefined names)
across every module including api.py/bot.py, a real runtime test against
an isolated .env fixture covering live price/toggle/HWID reads with zero
reimport, write-idempotency (no duplicate .env lines on repeated saves),
and the concrete bug this fixes end to end — computed an HMAC signature
against an old Platega secret, rotated the secret via update_env_var (the
same call the settings route makes), confirmed the old signature is now
rejected and a new one computed against the rotated secret verifies, all
in the same process with no reimport. Also ran the new CI step's exact
heredoc locally byte-for-byte before adding it to ci.yml. GitHub Actions
still won't trigger for this account (still under abuse-review, ticket
open >2 days) so this is the same substitute-for-CI rigor used all night.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 23:27:06 +05:00
1747d63539 perf: two more N+1s in bot.py, found by scanning the whole codebase for the pattern
Same shape as the admin-endpoint and build_subscription_text fixes
from earlier tonight, just two spots that scan hadn't covered:
cb_mysub (per-node db.get_node() in the loop building the 'my
subscriptions' bot message - the more user-facing of the two, fires
on every tap of that button) and reconcile_pending_payments (same
pattern in the 90s background reconciler, lower-impact since it only
reaches the lookup for payments that just turned paid, but same fix
either way for consistency).

Ran a small script over every db.py call site in api.py/bot.py/
links.py to confirm these were the only two still inside a loop —
everything else already resolved to a single-row lookup outside any
loop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 22:10:12 +05:00
4b86406041 feat: outbound webhooks for payment/subscription events
Per the docs.rw comparison researched earlier tonight, Remnawave
fires webhooks for users+nodes and Marzban for users — this panel
had neither, only received inbound webhooks from payment providers.

New webhooks.py, fired on payment.paid (both webhook-driven and
reconciler-driven grant paths, so it fires regardless of which one
actually processes a given payment) and
subscription.granted_by_admin (kept as a distinct event name rather
than reusing payment.paid, since no money necessarily changed hands
there). Settings tab gets a URL field; a secret is generated once on
first save via secrets.token_hex and never regenerated on later URL
edits, so a receiver's signature verification doesn't silently break
when the admin just updates the endpoint. Every delivery is
HMAC-SHA256 signed over the raw JSON body via X-Signature, same
verification shape Platega already uses for its inbound webhooks.

Delivery is fire-and-forget (10s timeout, swallows all exceptions) —
a receiver being down must never block or fail a payment grant.
Reads WEBHOOK_URL/WEBHOOK_SECRET fresh from .env via legal.py's
existing reader instead of adding a third copy of that logic.

Verified with a real local HTTP server: actual delivery, payload
shape, and that the received X-Signature verifies against the
configured secret using the receiver's own side of the HMAC — not
just asserting the sender computed *something*. Also verified the
no-URL-configured no-op path and that changing the URL later does not
rotate the secret.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 21:15:13 +05:00
52f5c551cb security: rate-limit admin login and TOTP verification
Neither endpoint had any brute-force protection — TOTP codes are only
6 digits (1M combinations) and HMAC-SHA1 verification is cheap, so an
unthrottled /admin/api/login/totp is a realistic brute-force target
within a pending token's 5-minute window. Password login had the same
gap.

DB-backed (new login_attempts table), not in-memory — this matters
now that mbs-api runs multiple worker processes (see 11c75c1): an
in-process counter would let an attacker split requests across
workers and bypass it entirely, same class of mistake as an
unsynchronized in-memory cache. Keyed by client IP (nginx already
sets X-Real-IP on every proxied request, install.sh has always done
this).

10 failed attempts / 15min for password, 10 / 5min for TOTP codes,
counted per-IP per-kind. Successful login clears that IP's recent
failures. Old rows pruned in the existing 90s periodic_sync cleanup
alongside sessions and pending_totp.

Verified: threshold counting, per-IP isolation, per-kind isolation
(password vs totp tracked separately), clear-on-success, and the
age-based cleanup only removing rows older than the cutoff.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 16:42:20 +05:00
7098e59967 feat: TOTP two-factor auth for admin login
Matches Remnawave's security-first positioning (passkeys/OAuth there)
with the more universal standard instead — RFC 6238 TOTP, works with
Google Authenticator/Authy/1Password/anything. Implemented from
scratch on stdlib only (hashlib/hmac/struct/base64) — no new
dependency — and verified against the official RFC 4226 HOTP test
vectors (all 10 pass exactly) before wiring it into any auth path.

Per-admin, optional: setup shows the secret + otpauth:// URI (no QR
render, just copyable text — didn't want to fake a QR library),
confirmed by entering a real code before it's persisted. Login is now
two-step when 2FA is on: password first (returns a short-lived
pending_token instead of a session if totp_secret is set), then a
second call with the pending_token + code creates the real session.
pending_totp rows are single-use and expire in 5 minutes, cleaned up
alongside the existing admin_sessions cleanup in periodic_sync.
Disabling 2FA requires re-entering the current password.

Verified end-to-end: enable/disable round trip, pending-token
resolve+single-use+expiry, code verification against the stored
secret, wrong-code and wrong-password rejection — on top of the raw
HOTP correctness check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 15:43:52 +05:00
81cbc4e391 fix: prune old backup safety-copies and expired admin sessions instead of letting them pile up forever
Every backup restore was leaving a .before-restore-<timestamp> safety
copy of both mbs.db and .env with no cleanup — would accumulate
forever on a panel that restores regularly. Now keeps the 5 most
recent and prunes the rest right after each restore. Verified: 8
fake copies pruned down to exactly the 5 newest, oldest-first.

admin_sessions rows also never got deleted once expired (only ever
filtered out of queries via expires_at>?) — same shape of problem.
Piggybacks on the existing 90s periodic_sync heartbeat in bot.py
instead of adding a new one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 15:08:34 +05:00
f9ee4f5933 fix: 18-point audit pass — payment races, hwid limit bugs, blocking SSH/HTTP in event loops, N+1 queries, ssh host-key pinning, dead code
payments: _grant_paid_subscription now validates plan/node exist before
marking a payment paid instead of after (was leaving charged-but-ungranted
payments with no error trail); mark_payment_paid is now a single atomic
UPDATE ... WHERE status='pending' instead of check-then-act, closing a
double-grant race between webhooks and the periodic reconciler; yookassa
webhook now re-verifies payment status server-side via the API instead of
trusting the posted body (platega already had HMAC verification).

hwid: 'user["hwid_limit"] or FALLBACK' treated an explicit 0 (admin fully
blocking a user) as unset — now an explicit None check. Device count-check
and insert are now one atomic transaction (db.add_device_if_under_limit)
instead of two raceable statements.

perf: payment webhooks and _grant_paid_subscription's SSH/HTTP calls now
run via asyncio.to_thread instead of blocking the event loop; same for
bot.py's periodic_sync/reconcile_pending_payments and the manual admin
sync button. Admin endpoints (traffic/subscriptions/payments/gift-codes/
user-card) now resolve node labels from one db.list_nodes() call instead
of a fresh db.get_node() per row. revoke/reset-traffic use a direct PK
lookup instead of scanning up to 5000 rows. Dashboard now asks the API
for 8 rows instead of fetching 200 and slicing client-side.

security: mbs.db (and -wal/-shm) now chmod 600 right after creation —
it held session tokens and subscription bearer tokens world-readable
by default. Node SSH connections now pin host keys via a persisted
known_hosts file (TOFU) instead of accepting any key on every connection.
delete_node now refuses to delete a node with active subscriptions
instead of silently orphaning their xray clients.

deadcode: removed unused xray_manager.list_client_ids and admin.html's
superseded staggerReveal (rows animate via rowAttr() inline now).

Also guards gift-code redemption against a plan/node deleted after the
code was created (was an unhandled KeyError/TypeError crash).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 22:20:54 +05:00
f5f8f21f5d payments: status verification (check + auto-reconcile pending), admin Payments view
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 22:46:55 +05:00
5b30d1f148 payments: Platega + YooKassa integration, opt-in via PAYMENTS_ENABLED
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 21:44:45 +05:00
073c4fb9f0 bot + api: telegram bot (aiogram) and FastAPI backend
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 17:45:43 +05:00