The setup wizard added last iteration only covered YooKassa, leaving
Platega (the second provider this panel has always supported) still
.env-only despite everything else in the payments flow treating both
providers symmetrically. Same GET/POST shape as the YooKassa settings
routes. Platega has no documented lightweight credentials-check
endpoint like YooKassa's /v3/me, so this one honestly says so in the
UI instead of saving through a fabricated validation call — it saves
directly and a bad key will surface on the first real payment attempt
instead of at save time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The site/offer.html and site/privacy.html legal templates existed in
the repo but were never actually wired to anything — no route served
them, install.sh never copied them anywhere. Nobody deploying this
for real payments had a live offer/privacy page, which YooKassa
requires for merchant approval.
Rewrote both templates with {{TOKEN}} placeholders (new legal.py
renders them from .env-backed settings, read fresh on every request,
no restart needed to fix a typo) and added a proper setup section in
the Payments tab: business type/name/INN/support contact/refund
window, saved via POST /admin/api/payments/legal-settings, live at
GET /offer and /privacy immediately. Unset fields render as a visible
not-set-yet badge instead of breaking the page. Effective date
auto-stamps once on first save and stays stable across later edits
(verified: editing the name afterward doesn't reset it).
YooKassa shop_id + secret_key get their own section: validated live
against YooKassa's own /v3/me before being saved (same pattern as the
existing bot-token getMe check), never echoed back to the frontend
once set. Includes an inline guide — where to find the keys in
YooKassa's dashboard, and that self-employed registration there needs
just passport + INN, no separate cash register.
Both new dropdowns use the existing custom .dd component, not a raw
select element — this codebase deliberately doesn't use native
selects (see the comment already in admin.html) because of the
OS-rendered white popup, so a new form had to follow that pattern,
not reintroduce it.
Verified: template rendering with empty settings (fallback badges,
no leftover tokens) and fully filled settings, HTML-escaping of field
values (a script tag in a field renders as text, not markup), the
one-time-only date stamp, and all new routes registering correctly.
Also fixed a stale doc string in the panel's own admin-facing docs
tab that still quoted the old rate-limit numbers from before the
real limits shipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Neither endpoint had any brute-force protection — TOTP codes are only
6 digits (1M combinations) and HMAC-SHA1 verification is cheap, so an
unthrottled /admin/api/login/totp is a realistic brute-force target
within a pending token's 5-minute window. Password login had the same
gap.
DB-backed (new login_attempts table), not in-memory — this matters
now that mbs-api runs multiple worker processes (see 11c75c1): an
in-process counter would let an attacker split requests across
workers and bypass it entirely, same class of mistake as an
unsynchronized in-memory cache. Keyed by client IP (nginx already
sets X-Real-IP on every proxied request, install.sh has always done
this).
10 failed attempts / 15min for password, 10 / 5min for TOTP codes,
counted per-IP per-kind. Successful login clears that IP's recent
failures. Old rows pruned in the existing 90s periodic_sync cleanup
alongside sessions and pending_totp.
Verified: threshold counting, per-IP isolation, per-kind isolation
(password vs totp tracked separately), clear-on-success, and the
age-based cleanup only removing rows older than the cutoff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Matches Remnawave's security-first positioning (passkeys/OAuth there)
with the more universal standard instead — RFC 6238 TOTP, works with
Google Authenticator/Authy/1Password/anything. Implemented from
scratch on stdlib only (hashlib/hmac/struct/base64) — no new
dependency — and verified against the official RFC 4226 HOTP test
vectors (all 10 pass exactly) before wiring it into any auth path.
Per-admin, optional: setup shows the secret + otpauth:// URI (no QR
render, just copyable text — didn't want to fake a QR library),
confirmed by entering a real code before it's persisted. Login is now
two-step when 2FA is on: password first (returns a short-lived
pending_token instead of a session if totp_secret is set), then a
second call with the pending_token + code creates the real session.
pending_totp rows are single-use and expire in 5 minutes, cleaned up
alongside the existing admin_sessions cleanup in periodic_sync.
Disabling 2FA requires re-entering the current password.
Verified end-to-end: enable/disable round trip, pending-token
resolve+single-use+expiry, code verification against the stored
secret, wrong-code and wrong-password rejection — on top of the raw
HOTP correctness check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Matches Marzban's multi-admin (WIP there) and closes a real gap vs
both. New 'admins' table (username + PBKDF2-SHA256 password hash,
200k iterations, random salt per account, stdlib hashlib/hmac only —
no new dependency), admin_sessions now tracks which admin is logged
in. Existing installs aren't broken: on first run, if no admins exist
yet, a default 'admin' account is seeded from the current
ADMIN_PANEL_PASSWORD — old password keeps working under username
'admin', pre-filled on the login screen.
Admin management lives in Settings: list, add (username + password,
min 8 chars), remove. Can't delete the last remaining admin or your
own currently-logged-in account. Sidebar now shows who's logged in.
Verified end-to-end: bootstrap, correct/wrong/nonexistent login,
session->admin resolution, last-admin-delete protection, duplicate
username rejection, add/remove round trip, and that identical
passwords hash to different values (unique salt) but both verify.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Matches Remnawave/Marzban's 'Host Sorting via Web UI' — was the one
concrete UI gap flagged in the comparison research. Nodes get a
persistent sort_order column (backfilled once from the existing
de1-first/created_at order on migration, verified idempotent — re-running
_migrate() on an already-migrated db does not reshuffle it back).
Plain HTML5 drag-and-drop (dragstart/dragover/drop), no library —
matches the project's no-frameworks admin.html. Drop reorders the
in-memory list optimistically, re-renders immediately, then persists
via POST /admin/api/nodes/reorder; a failed save reloads from the
server instead of leaving the UI out of sync with the db.
db.reorder_nodes() rejects any list that doesn't contain exactly the
current set of node codes (no silent drops or duplicates). New nodes
append at the end (MAX(sort_order)+1) instead of jumping to the front.
Verified with a full test: initial order, reorder, two rejected
malformed reorders, a new node appending at the end, and migration
re-run not touching an already-backfilled order.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Neither Remnawave nor Marzban has this natively (community tools only,
per docs.rw's own comparison table) — one-click download of a tar.gz
with a consistent SQLite snapshot (via sqlite3's backup API, safe even
under WAL) plus .env, and upload-to-restore from the same file.
Restore validates the archive is real (gzip + tar structure), that
mbs.db is an actual sqlite database with the expected tables (not
just any file named mbs.db), and rejects oversized uploads — before
touching anything live. Takes a timestamped safety copy of the
current db/.env before overwriting, clears stale -wal/-shm siblings
so the restored file doesn't get replayed against the wrong WAL, and
restarts mbs-bot automatically when .env was part of the restore
(api.py isn't restarted from within its own request handler for the
obvious reason).
Verified with a full round-trip test: backup -> mutate state -> restore
-> confirm the mutation is reverted, plus three negative cases (garbage
data, oversized upload, a fake non-sqlite mbs.db) all correctly
rejected with no side effects.
Needs python-multipart for FastAPI's UploadFile — added to
requirements.txt, picked up by the next 'mbs update'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
payments: _grant_paid_subscription now validates plan/node exist before
marking a payment paid instead of after (was leaving charged-but-ungranted
payments with no error trail); mark_payment_paid is now a single atomic
UPDATE ... WHERE status='pending' instead of check-then-act, closing a
double-grant race between webhooks and the periodic reconciler; yookassa
webhook now re-verifies payment status server-side via the API instead of
trusting the posted body (platega already had HMAC verification).
hwid: 'user["hwid_limit"] or FALLBACK' treated an explicit 0 (admin fully
blocking a user) as unset — now an explicit None check. Device count-check
and insert are now one atomic transaction (db.add_device_if_under_limit)
instead of two raceable statements.
perf: payment webhooks and _grant_paid_subscription's SSH/HTTP calls now
run via asyncio.to_thread instead of blocking the event loop; same for
bot.py's periodic_sync/reconcile_pending_payments and the manual admin
sync button. Admin endpoints (traffic/subscriptions/payments/gift-codes/
user-card) now resolve node labels from one db.list_nodes() call instead
of a fresh db.get_node() per row. revoke/reset-traffic use a direct PK
lookup instead of scanning up to 5000 rows. Dashboard now asks the API
for 8 rows instead of fetching 200 and slicing client-side.
security: mbs.db (and -wal/-shm) now chmod 600 right after creation —
it held session tokens and subscription bearer tokens world-readable
by default. Node SSH connections now pin host keys via a persisted
known_hosts file (TOFU) instead of accepting any key on every connection.
delete_node now refuses to delete a node with active subscriptions
instead of silently orphaning their xray clients.
deadcode: removed unused xray_manager.list_client_ids and admin.html's
superseded staggerReveal (rows animate via rowAttr() inline now).
Also guards gift-code redemption against a plan/node deleted after the
code was created (was an unhandled KeyError/TypeError crash).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
